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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 27, 2001, Deputy Sheriff Robert Brokenbrough noticed
a Buick with expired registration tags.1 After verifying from the police
dispatcher that the application for renewal tags was being processed, and
therefore the Buick was not in violation of any traffic laws, he decided to
pull the Buick over anyway.2 When Brokenbrough approached the vehicle,
he saw the passenger, Bruce Brendlin, whom he recognized as someone
who had dropped out of parole supervision.3 When backup arrived, the
officers ordered Brendlin out of the car at gunpoint and placed him under
arrest.4 Deputies found an orange syringe cap on Brendlin, and a search of
the car revealed tubing and a scale, objects used for the production of
methamphetamine.5
Brendlin was charged with the possession and manufacture of
methamphetamine.6 He later moved to suppress the evidence obtained
during both searches as fruits of an unconstitutional seizure of his person.7
The trial court found that Brendlin, as a passenger, was not seized during
the lawful traffic stop and denied the motion.8 Brendlin ultimately pleaded
guilty, subject to an appeal on the suppression motion.9
The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that
a passenger is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment during
a traffic stop because a reasonable person in the passenger’s position
would not have felt free to depart without the officer’s permission.10
At first blush, this holding seemed wholly unremarkable. Indeed, this
decision comported with the views of nine circuit courts of appeal,11 and
1. Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2403 (2007).
2. Id. at 2403–04.
3. Id. at 2404.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. The state appellate court reversed but was in turn reversed by the Supreme Court of
California, which held that as a matter of constitutional law a passenger is not seized during a
traffic stop, absent additional circumstances. Id. at 2404–05.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2406–07. The Brendlin holding was reaffirmed in Arizona v. Johnson, 2009 U.S.
LEXIS 868, *7–8 (Jan. 26, 2009).
11. See United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 253 & n.6 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v.
Perez, 440 F.3d 363, 369 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Grant, 349 F.3d 192, 196 (5th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Ameling, 328 F.3d 443, 446 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Twilley, 222 F.3d
1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Eylicio-Montoya, 70 F.3d 1158, 1163–64 (10th Cir.
1995); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d
868, 874 n.4 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Powell, 929 F.2d 1190, 1195 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding
that vehicle passengers are seized when a vehicle is stopped by police and that passengers have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the seizure).
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nearly every state to have confronted the issue.12 Authors of treatises on
Fourth Amendment seizures have also agreed, even without a clear
mandate from the Court.13 The Court even noted that it had essentially
already reached its conclusion in previous cases, albeit in dicta.14 During
oral argument, the Justices seemed incredulous at California’s position that
a reasonable passenger would feel free to leave the scene during a traffic
stop.15
Despite the common-sense nature of the Court’s decision, the result
was hardly a foregone conclusion. Indeed, in stark contrast to the Brendlin
holding that passengers have standing to object to illegal seizures during
traffic stops, the Court has routinely declared that passengers do not have

12. See, e.g., State v. Bowers, 976 S.W.2d 379, 381–82 (Ark. 1998); State v. Haworth, 679
P.2d 1123, 1123–24 (Idaho 1984); People v. Bunch, 796 N.E.2d 1024, 1029 (Ill. 2003); State v. Eis,
348 N.W.2d 224, 226 (Iowa 1984); State v. Hodges, 851 P.2d 352, 361 (Kan. 1993); State v. Carter,
630 N.E.2d 355, 360 (Ohio 1994); State v. Harris, 557 N.W.2d 245, 251 (Wis. 1996) (holding that
vehicle passengers are seized when a vehicle is stopped by police and that passengers have standing
to challenge the constitutionality of the seizure). Other than California, only two states adhered to
the view that a passenger is not seized when the car in which the passenger is riding is stopped by
police. See People v. Jackson, 39 P.3d 1174, 1184 (Colo. 2002) (en banc); State v. Mendez, 970
P.2d 722, 729 (Wash. 1999) (en banc). Of course, the courts of those states will now have to follow
the federal constitutional rule set forth in Brendlin.
13. See, e.g., 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 11.3(e), at 194 (4th ed. 2004) (“If either the stopping of the car, the length of the
passenger’s detention thereafter, or the passenger’s removal from it are unreasonable in a Fourth
Amendment sense, then surely the passenger has standing to object to those constitutional
violations and to have suppressed any evidence found in the car which is their fruit.” (internal
citations omitted)). This treatise is mentioned favorably by the Court in Brendlin. Brendlin, 127 S.
Ct. at 2408.
14. Brendlin, 127 S. Ct. at 2406. The Court nearly decided the issue in two cases dealing with
the unlawful seizure of a passenger, and neither time did the Court indicate any distinction between
the driver and the passenger that would affect the Fourth Amendment analysis. See Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808–10 (1996) (failing to distinguish between driver and passenger
where both claimed to have been illegally seized during a traffic stop); Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 653 (1979) (noting that stopping a vehicle constitutes a seizure of the “occupants”).
15. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 32–34, Brendlin, 127 S. Ct. 2400 (No. 06-8120). In
response to the California advocate’s position that a reasonable passenger would feel free to leave
when stopped by police, Justice Kennedy remarked:
You’re representing the State of California and you want to establish the
proposition that any time there is a traffic stop in the State of California or I guess
anywhere in the United States all the passengers are free to immediately leave,
absent some further countermanding officer—order by the officer. I think that’s
a quite surprising proposition . . . . I just think you have no social or empirical
documentation for that position.
Id. at 32–33.
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standing to challenge the constitutionality of searches of automobiles in
which they are riding.16
This Note argues that the holding of the Court’s past decisions denying
passengers standing to challenge searches comports neither with logic nor
with its recent decision in Brendlin, and should therefore be changed. Part
II explains the development of the law regarding passenger standing in
searches, while Part III explains the development of the law regarding
passenger standing in seizures. Part IV argues that the differing approaches
to passenger standing are theoretically inconsistent and cannot be
reconciled. Part V addresses the reason for this inconsistency; namely, the
Court’s erroneous determinations of how a “reasonable” person feels
during searches and seizures, and the Court’s poor judgment of societal
perceptions of reasonable behavior. Finally, Part VI offers a
recommendation for a proper resolution of the two positions.
II. PASSENGER STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES
A. Early Approaches to the Definition of “Search”
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”17 However, not all police
action implicates the Fourth Amendment. Only conduct that qualifies as
a “search” or “seizure” is subject to the Amendment’s reasonableness
requirement.18 The precise definition of a search, therefore, has been a
central question in the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.19 At first, the Court based its definition of a search on
16. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978). The use of the word “standing” here does
not refer to the standing doctrine that emanates from Article III’s “case or controversy”
requirement. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Rather, it refers to the
ability of a defendant to challenge, under the Fourth Amendment, the constitutionality of a search
or seizure. Interestingly, although the Rakas Court attempted to remove the word “standing” from
the analysis, Rakas, 439 U.S. at 138–40, courts and commentators have continued to use the term.
See Arizona v. Johnson, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 868, *16 (Jan. 26, 2009) (“A passenger therefore has
standing to challenge a stop’s constitutionality.”); LAFAVE, supra note 13; Sherry F. Colb, Standing
Room Only: Why Fourth Amendment Exclusion and Standing Can No Longer Logically Coexist,
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663, 1664 n.1 (2007) (continuing to refer to the inquiry in terms of
“standing”). Thus, for clarity and harmony with the Court’s previous cases, this Note will also refer
to the inquiry in terms of “standing.”
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. WELSH S. WHITE & JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRAINTS ON INVESTIGATION AND PROOF 3 (6th ed. 2008).
19. See id. at 3–4. For a general review of search and seizure definitions, see Stephen P.
Jones, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Searches, Seizures, and the Concept of Fourth
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property law concepts, holding that police conduct is not a search unless
it qualifies as a common-law trespass.20 That approach was later refined to
define a search as any physical invasion, no matter how small, even if such
an invasion did not qualify as a trespass.21
In 1967, the Court in Katz v. United States abandoned the physical
invasion approach and laid the foundation for the modern conception of a
Fourth Amendment search.22 In Katz, the Court eschewed any reliance on
physical intrusion or property law, and declared that a search occurs when
the aggrieved person can claim that the government violated a justified or
legitimate expectation of privacy.23 This inquiry comprises two distinct
questions: first, whether the person exhibits a subjective expectation of
privacy, and second, whether society is prepared to recognize that
expectation of privacy as reasonable.24 This formulation continues today
to define what constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.25
This threshold requirement has important implications. If the conduct
of the police is a search, then it must be reasonable.26 If a court finds that
the police did not have probable cause to search or otherwise acted

Amendment Standing, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 907 (1997) and David E. Steinberg, The Original
Understanding of Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1051 (2004).
20. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that a wiretap was not
a search and noting that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated unless there was a physical
search of a person, a seizure of tangible effects, or an actual physical invasion of a house or
curtilage).
21. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506, 512 (1961) (holding that a search
occurred when police inserted a “‘spike mike’” several inches into the wall to listen to
conversations); cf. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 131, 135 (1942) (holding that when
the police placed a “detectaphone” against the outer wall of a building and listened to conversations
inside, this was not a search because there was no physical invasion).
22. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.”).
23. Id. at 353.
24. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Although this formulation of the test did not appear
in the majority opinion, and only appeared in Justice Harlan’s concurrence, this two-part test was
quickly adopted as the law in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740
(1979) (adopting Justice Harlan’s two-part test).
25. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (applying Justice Harlan’s twopart test). An alternate formulation of the test, which appeared a year after Katz, is “whether the
area was one in which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental
intrusion.” Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 352).
26. What constitutes a “reasonable” search or seizure (that is, what level of justification is
needed before police can conduct a search or seizure) is beyond the scope of this Note. In the
automobile context, generally the decision to stop a vehicle “is reasonable where the police have
probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 810 (1996).
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unreasonably, it can suppress the evidence obtained in that search.27
However, if the conduct is not a search, it is not subject to the
reasonableness requirement, and thus the evidence will not be suppressed
no matter how unreasonable the police actions were.28
B. Automobile Searches
The Court has routinely held that drivers have a legitimate expectation
of privacy in their cars, such that police examinations of the interior of
cars qualifies as a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.29
However, even though several cases implied that passengers, at least in
some situations, enjoyed a similar expectation, the decision in Rakas v.
Illinois made clear that the Court was not extending the Amendment’s
protection against unreasonable searches to passengers of the car.30 Thus,
if the police stop an automobile and conduct an unconstitutional search of
the car, the driver can challenge the constitutionality of the search and seek
to have the obtained evidence suppressed. However, if the obtained
evidence also implicates the passenger, the passenger cannot challenge the
constitutionality of the search.31
This reasoning originally revolved around the concept of standing,
which was explained in Alderman v. United States: “The established
principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment
violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were
violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the
introduction of damaging evidence.”32 This rule was further explained by
the test set forth in Jones v. United States, in which the Court held that
anyone who was legitimately on the searched premises had an interest
sufficient to assert standing.33 In the case of a residence (which was the
case in Jones), this essentially meant that if a person were there with the
permission of the owner or regular tenant, that person was legitimately on
the premises and therefore had Fourth Amendment standing.34 Thus,
before Rakas, several Supreme Court opinions assumed that, because a

27. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule
applies to the states).
28. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 740–42.
29. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 49 (1970) (“‘[Drivers] have a right to free
passage without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official, authorized to
search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal
merchandise.’” (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925))).
30. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978).
31. Id. at 148–49.
32. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171–72 (1969).
33. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960).
34. Id.
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passenger was in the car with the driver’s or owner’s permission, the
passenger had standing to challenge an unlawful search of the car.35
Therefore, it came as a surprise when Rakas definitively declared that
passengers could not challenge the lawfulness of searches of automobiles
in which they were riding.36 In Rakas, police officers pulled over a car they
suspected had just been used in a robbery and ordered the occupants,
including the passengers, out of the car.37 The police searched the car and
discovered a box of rifle shells in the locked glove compartment and a
sawed-off shotgun under the passenger seat.38 The passengers later moved
to suppress the rifle and shells found in the car on the grounds that the
search violated the Fourth Amendment.39 The trial court denied the
motion, finding that the passengers lacked standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the search.40 The state appellate court agreed, and the
Illinois Supreme Court denied the petitioners leave to appeal.41
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed in a 5-4 decision.42 Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, reasoned that the determinative
question was whether the person contesting the lawfulness of the search
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the space searched.43 Since the
definition of a search is an invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy,
the inquiry essentially boiled down to whether that particular person was
searched within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.44
Applying the announced principle, the Court concluded that the
passengers had no legitimate expectation of privacy, since the car was
driven and owned by someone else and the passengers asserted no interest

35. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219–20 (1973) (noting that
respondent was neither driver nor owner, and owner was not in the automobile at all); Chambers
v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 43 (1970) (noting that petitioner was neither driver nor owner); Dyke v.
Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 217–18 (1968) (noting that two out of three petitioners
were neither driver nor owner); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 365 (1964) (noting that
petitioner was neither driver nor owner).
36. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148; see also Christopher Slobogin, Capacity to Contest a Search and
Seizure: The Passing of Old Rules and Some Suggestions for New Ones, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 387,
387 (1981) (“In Rakas v. Illinois, however, the Court substantially altered both the form and the
substance of [the Fourth Amendment] inquiry.”).
37. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 129–30.
40. Id. at 131.
41. Id. at 131–32.
42. Id. at 150, 156.
43. Id. at 148.
44. Id. at 140 (“[T]he question is whether the challenged search or seizure violated the Fourth
Amendment rights of a criminal defendant . . . . That inquiry in turn requires a determination of
whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth
Amendment was designed to protect.”).
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in the seized property.45 According to the Court, a locked glove
compartment, the space underneath the passenger seat, and the trunk of a
car are all areas in which passengers do not have legitimate expectations
of privacy.46 Therefore, the Court concluded, because the passengers had
no legitimate expectation of privacy, they were not searched within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and they could not challenge the
constitutionality of the police action.47
Rakas rejected the previous framework of Jones and its progeny, which
analyzed the concept of standing in terms of whether the person seeking
to challenge the legality of the search was legitimately on the searched
premises.48 Although the Rakas Court upheld the factual holding of Jones,
it expressly declined to adopt its legitimately-on-the-premises formulation
as the general rule, noting that such a test relied on property law concepts,
which was something the Court claimed it was unwilling to do.49
In sum, to demonstrate a Fourth Amendment search violation, a
defendant must show a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area or
items searched. For automobile searches, the Court has held that
passengers generally have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the cars
in which they are riding, and thus do not have standing to challenge a
search of the car.
III. PASSENGER STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
SEIZURES DURING TRAFFIC STOPS
In addition to prohibiting unreasonable searches, the Fourth
Amendment protects against unreasonable “seizures.”50 Both property and
persons are subject to seizure by police.51 However, as mentioned above,
not all police action qualifies as a seizure within the meaning of the
Amendment.52 When the police make a traffic stop, the driver of the car is
unquestionably seized, but up until the recent Brendlin decision it was
unclear whether a passenger was also seized. This Part explains the law

45. Id. at 148.
46. Id. at 148–49.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 132–33.
49. Id. at 141–42. Lower courts have generally not diverged from Rakas. See, e.g., United
States v. Bouffard, 917 F.2d 673, 677–78 (1st Cir. 1990) (remanding for determination of whether
defendant, the driver and owner of a vehicle, had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the trunk
of the car); United States v. Smith, 621 F.2d 483, 487 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that a driver, but nonowner, of a vehicle has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle’s trunk).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
51. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207 n.6 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 16 (1968).
52. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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behind the seizure-of-persons doctrine, and how that doctrine led to the
Brendlin decision.
A. The Definition of a Fourth Amendment Seizure of a Person
As with searches, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated unless a
seizure has taken place.53 If so, the police action must be reasonable; if
there is no seizure, then no Fourth Amendment limitation is placed on the
police.54 Moreover, if the police conduct an unreasonable seizure, any
evidence obtained pursuant to that seizure is generally inadmissible.55
Therefore, the precise definition of a “seizure” of a person is of great
importance. The landmark case of Terry v. Ohio established that
“whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom
to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.”56 The Court later refined that
definition by stating that “a person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he
was not free to leave.”57
In Florida v. Bostick, the Court considered the question of seizures of
persons on public buses.58 In Bostick, police officers conducting random
searches of buses traveling between cities approached a suspect on a bus
and asked him for consent to search his luggage.59 The Florida Supreme
Court held that because a reasonable person in the suspect’s position
would not have felt free to leave, the suspect was seized within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.60 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed,
holding that a strict application of the rule—whether a reasonable person
53. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
54. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507–08 (1983) (plurality opinion) (holding that
evidence obtained pursuant to an unreasonable seizure was tainted).
56. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. In recent years the Court has narrowed the definition of a seizure
to expand the range of conduct that an officer may engage in without triggering the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., William R. Snyder, Jr., Slipping Down the Slope of Probable Cause: An
Unreasonable Exception to What Was Once a Reasonable Rule: Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District
Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004), 57 FLA. L. REV. 445, 445–46 (2005) (explaining that police may now
demand identification without triggering the Fourth Amendment).
57. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion). A majority
of the Court later adopted this definition in Royer, 460 U.S. at 502 (“These circumstances surely
amount to a show of official authority such that ‘a reasonable person would have believed that he
was not free to leave.’” (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554)); see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S.
210, 215 (1984) (same). The Court later characterized the test as whether “the police
conduct . . . communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police
presence and go about his business.” Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988).
58. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 433 (1991).
59. Id. at 431–32.
60. Id. at 433.
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would feel “free to leave”—was inappropriate.61 The rule, the Court
reasoned, should not be strictly confined to whether a reasonable person
would feel free to physically leave the scene, because that rule would have
no application in the bus scenario, where the passengers already do not
feel free to depart the bus.62 Rather, “the appropriate inquiry is whether a
reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests [for
information] or otherwise terminate the encounter.”63 The Court stressed
that it was not breaking new ground, but merely following the logic of the
principle set forth in previous opinions.64
B. Seizures of Persons in Traffic Stops
These principles are readily applicable to the automobile traffic stop.
“The law is settled that in Fourth Amendment terms a traffic stop entails
a seizure of the driver ‘even though the purpose of the stop is limited and
the resulting detention quite brief.’”65 Indeed, the few cases that have
indirectly addressed the issue seem to have quite naturally assumed this
without feeling the need to explain it.66 And although the Court, before
Brendlin, had not squarely answered the question of whether a passenger
is also seized, it had repeated in dicta that during a traffic stop an officer
seizes everyone in the vehicle, not just the driver.67
C. The Brendlin Decision
Thus, the question in Brendlin v. California was whether a passenger,
when the car in which the passenger is riding is stopped by the police,
would feel free to terminate the encounter with the police.68 In Brendlin,

61. Id. at 436.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 437.
65. Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2406 (2007) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 653 (1979)).
66. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 (1996) (assuming, without deciding,
that the occupants of a vehicle are seized when the vehicle is subjected to a traffic stop); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556–58 (1976) (same); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (same).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226 (1985) (“[S]topping a car and
detaining its occupants constitute a seizure . . . .”); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436–37
(1984) (“[W]e have long acknowledged that stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants
constitute a seizure . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 4 n.3
(1980) (“There can be no question that the stopping of a vehicle and the detention of its occupants
constitute a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653
(“[S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a ‘seizure’ within the meaning
of [the Fourth Amendment] . . . .”).
68. Brendlin, 127 S. Ct. at 2406. Despite the Court’s admonition in Bostick that the proper
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the police made an unconstitutional traffic stop of the car in which
Brendlin was a passenger, searched the car, and discovered drug
paraphernalia.69 Brendlin was charged with the possession and
manufacture of methamphetamine.70 He later moved to suppress the
evidence obtained during both searches as fruits of an unconstitutional
seizure of his person.71 Brendlin claimed that the seizure occurred when
the car in which he was a passenger was stopped by the police, and that,
because the police lacked any reasonable suspicion to do so, the seizure
was unconstitutional, and therefore any evidence obtained after that illegal
seizure should have been suppressed.72 The trial court denied the
suppression motion, finding that the stop was lawful and that, even if it
were not, Brendlin was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment until the police ordered him out of the car.73 Brendlin pleaded
guilty subject to appeal on the suppression issue and was sentenced to four
years in prison.74
On appeal, the California Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
Brendlin was seized by the traffic stop, and that the seizure had been
unlawful because the police lacked any reasonable suspicion to stop the
car.75 The State appealed to the California Supreme Court.76 The State
conceded that the officer had no reasonable suspicion to believe that the
car was being operated unlawfully and therefore should not have stopped
the car.77 Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court reversed, holding
that, even though the stop was unlawful, Brendlin, as a passenger rather
than the driver, was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, and therefore the trial court was correct in refusing to
suppress the evidence.78
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that a
passenger is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when
the car in which the passenger is riding is stopped by police, because a
reasonable person in the passenger’s position would not have felt free to

inquiry was not whether a person would feel free to physically depart the scene, the Court in
Brendlin seemed to assume that, for any passenger to terminate a traffic stop encounter, the
passenger must necessarily physically depart from the scene. Id. at 2407.
69. Id. at 2404, 2406. For a fuller recitation of the facts, see supra text accompanying notes
1–10.
70. Brendlin, 127 S. Ct. at 2404.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2404–05.
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depart without the officer’s permission.79 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court relied on two observations. First, the Court noted that a police
officer at the scene of a crime, arrest, or investigation will not let people
move around in ways that could jeopardize the officer’s safety.80 Indeed,
there is a “societal expectation of ‘unquestioned [police] command’ at
odds with any notion that a passenger would feel free to leave, or to
terminate the personal encounter any other way, without advance
permission.”81 Second, the Court noted:
Holding that the passenger in a private car is not (without
more) seized in a traffic stop would invite police officers to
stop cars with passengers regardless of probable cause or
reasonable suspicion of anything illegal. The fact that
evidence uncovered as a result of an arbitrary traffic stop
would still be admissible against any passengers would be a
powerful incentive to run the kind of ‘roving patrols’ that
would still violate the driver’s Fourth Amendment right.82
Thus, the Court recognized that the passenger seizure rule was necessary
to deter illegal police action.
Because a passenger is seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment during a traffic stop, that passenger has standing to challenge
the constitutionality of the traffic stop if prosecutors seek to introduce any
evidence obtained pursuant to the stop at the passenger’s criminal trial.
This doctrine stands in stark contrast to the doctrine employed when a
passenger attempts to challenge the admission of evidence obtained
pursuant to a search of a car. This apparent inconsistency will be explored
in the next Part.
IV. INCONSISTENT DOCTRINES: PASSENGER STANDING TO
CHALLENGE SEARCHES VERSUS SEIZURES
The Brendlin decision raises an interesting paradox: If passengers can
challenge unconstitutional seizures, why then are they not permitted to
challenge unconstitutional searches? In one scenario the police have full
reign to violate the Fourth Amendment and still use evidence against
passengers that would be inadmissible against the driver. In the other, the
police cannot use the evidence obtained against either occupant. To clarify
the difference, imagine the following scenarios.

79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 2403, 2406–07.
Id. at 2407.
Id. (quoting Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997)).
Id. at 2410.
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In Scenario 1, the police observe a car commit a traffic violation and
pull the car over. This seizure is legal because the observation of the traffic
violation provided the justification necessary to make the traffic stop.83
The police officer approaches the car, and, without any justification, orders
all the occupants out of the car and commences a search of the car.84 This
search is illegal because the officer had no justification to search the car.85
The officer finds marijuana in the center console, and arrests both the
driver and the passenger.86 Here, the driver would be able to suppress the
evidence because the search was illegal (i.e., the driver’s Fourth
Amendment rights were violated because the driver had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the car). The passenger, on the other hand, has
no standing to challenge the search against his Fourth Amendment rights
because, according to the Court, the passenger had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in someone else’s car absent some particularized
showing of a sufficient interest.87 Thus, the police may use this evidence
against the passenger, but not against the driver.
In Scenario 2, a police officer stops a vehicle without any suspicion of
wrongdoing. This seizure is illegal because the officer had no justification
for making the stop.88 The officer approaches the car, and exactly as in

83. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (stating that the police’s decision
to stop an automobile is reasonable when the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation has occurred).
84. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has often condoned such disturbing official behavior
when it is directed toward vulnerable groups of people. See, e.g., Alfredo Mirandé, Is There a
“Mexican Exception” to the Fourth Amendment?, 55 FLA. L. REV. 365, 368 (2003) (arguing that
Mexican aliens are subject to warrantless searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth
Amendment); Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L.
REV. 391, 391 (2003) (arguing that alienage, race, and poverty affect police investigations governed
by the Fourth Amendment).
85. See Chambers v. Maroney, 339 U.S. 42, 48 (1970) (“[A]utomobiles and other
conveyances may be searched without a warrant in circumstances that would not justify the search
without a warrant of a house or an office, provided that there is probable cause to believe that the
car contains articles that the officers are entitled to seize.”).
86. The discovery of drugs to which none of the car’s occupants claim ownership provides
sufficient justification for arresting all of the occupants. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372
(2003).
87. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978) (stating that petitioners made no showing
that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in various parts of the car in which they were
passengers). The Rakas opinion yields the inevitable conclusion that passengers, without showing
more, can never object to a search of the car, no matter where the items are located. See LAFAVE,
supra note 13, § 11.3(e), at 196–97 (“Given the fact that in Rakas a justified expectation of privacy
is deemed to be lacking not only as to such places as the trunk and glove compartment, but also as
to an area closer to the passengers under the seat, it is doubtful there is such an expectation
anywhere in the vehicle.” (internal citations omitted)).
88. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (holding that suspicionless stops of
automobiles violate the Fourth Amendment).
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Scenario 1, without justification orders the occupants out of the car and
commences a search of the car. Again, the officer finds marijuana in the
center console and arrests both the driver and the passenger. Here, unlike
in Scenario 1, both the driver and the passenger will be able to suppress
the evidence because the initial seizure of the car was unconstitutional, and
any evidence obtained subsequent to the stop becomes illegally obtained.89
Thus, the question becomes, how are the two scenarios sufficiently
different so as to produce a different outcome for the passenger? The only
difference is the illegality of the initial seizure, or traffic stop. In Scenario
2, the officer lacked any objective justification for seizing the car and its
occupants, whereas in Scenario 1 the initial seizure was valid. After the
initial seizure, the events proceed in exactly the same way, but the
passenger’s ability to challenge the police action is different depending on
the legality of the initial traffic stop. The seizure distinction, therefore, is
what determines whether a passenger has standing to challenge the
constitutionality of police action when a car is stopped by police.
However, that distinction has no basis in the Court’s precedent or in
common sense—in fact, by failing to examine the passenger’s expectation
of privacy, it ignores the very inquiry that the Court painstakingly crafted
over the years. The question must be approached from the standpoint of a
constitutional analysis, which examines why there was a constitutional
violation in each case. In most cases, the Court stressed that the primary
purpose behind the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy.90 Thus,
to best protect that interest, the Court fashioned a test that focuses on
whether the person had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the spaces
invaded by the police.91 Consistent with this, the Court insisted that its
cases denying standing to passengers who are trying to challenge searches
are based on the fact that the passenger had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the car, and should have expected that anyone could view items
in the car.92
With passengers, however, the distinction cannot be justified on the
grounds of protecting a privacy interest. If the true definition of a Fourth
Amendment search is a reasonable expectation of privacy, the passenger
search versus seizure distinction essentially implies that a passenger has
a reasonable expectation of privacy when the police unlawfully stop the
car, but no such expectation if the police stop the car lawfully. This means

89. See Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2410 (2007) (stating that evidence uncovered
as a result of an arbitrary traffic stop would be inadmissible against any passengers).
90. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
91. See id.
92. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148–49 (stating that the glove compartment, area under the seat,
and trunk of an automobile are areas in which passengers would not normally have a legitimate
expectation of privacy).
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that a passenger’s Fourth Amendment rights can be extinguished by valid
police conduct, but reaffirmed by invalid police conduct, with absolutely
no change in the expectation of privacy analysis. If passenger standing,
however, truly turns on a passenger’s expectation of privacy, it should not
turn on the legality of police conduct. If a passenger does not have a
privacy interest that warrants Fourth Amendment protection when the
police make a valid traffic stop, there is no reason to hold that the
passenger’s interest rises to a constitutional level when the police make an
invalid traffic stop.
The main justification for the distinction is the initial illegality of the
police action. This point has limited validity: If evidence obtained
subsequent to an invalid seizure is inadmissible as to any occupant, police
will be discouraged from stopping random cars in the hopes of finding
contraband.93 However, while the deterrence of unjustified police conduct
is certainly a valid purpose of Fourth Amendment evidence exclusion, that
does not end the inquiry. An analysis of the passenger’s expectation of
privacy must be conducted.
Another rationale behind the decision in Rakas not to accord
passengers with standing to challenge searches is the fact that the driver
can still raise a constitutional challenge, which will provide the necessary
deterrence to police misconduct.94 However, this creates two problems.
First, in the cases where evidence implicates both the passenger and the
driver, the driver may not be charged with a crime, and therefore no one
may object to the introduction of evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Second, and more important, this rationale applies
with equal force to seizures. That is, the driver is still available to
challenge the legality of the police action when the police unlawfully, as
opposed to lawfully, stop a car. The reasoning should be equally
applicable to seizures.95
The implicit distinction fashioned by Rakas and Brendlin poses another
problem. Because passenger standing now turns on the legality of the
initial traffic stop, passenger standing now also turns entirely on the
conduct of the driver. If the driver does not violate a traffic law, then,
absent some other justification for stopping the car, passenger standing is
preserved. If, however, the driver violates a traffic law, an action over

93. See Stanley Ingber, Procedure, Ceremony and Rhetoric: The Minimization of Ideological
Conflict in Deviance Control, 56 B.U. L. REV. 266, 304–05 (1976) (stating that police may often
be willing to risk suppression by some defendants to gain evidence that may be admissible against
others); Welsh S. White & Robert S. Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U.
PA. L. REV. 333, 349, 365 (1970) (same).
94. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134 (“There is no reason to think that a party whose rights have been
infringed will not, if evidence is used against him, have ample motivation to move to suppress it.”).
95. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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which the passenger has no control, the police are justified in making a
seizure, and thus the passenger no longer has standing to challenge any
subsequent police misconduct. Again, the distinction turns on events that
do not affect the passenger’s expectation of privacy. If the primary purpose
of the Fourth Amendment is the vindication of privacy rights, then the
search versus seizure distinction for passenger standing cannot be justified
because the passenger’s standing (and, by implication, the passenger’s
expectation of privacy) changes based on circumstances over which the
passenger has no control and that do not actually change the expectation
of privacy.
A further inconsistency that flows from this distinction arises in the
context of searches based on third-party consent. Twelve years after
Rakas, in Illinois v. Rodriguez the Court held that consent to search from
a third party is valid any time the police reasonably believe that the third
party has a privacy interest in the area, even if that party does not in fact
have such an interest.96 Applying this holding to the facts of Rakas, as long
as the police are reasonable (albeit erroneous) in thinking a passenger has
an interest in the glove compartment, consent obtained from either would
validate a search of the glove compartment, even though (according to the
Court), neither has an interest. This is inconsistent: A person cannot
simultaneously have an interest sufficient to consent to a search yet
insufficient to assert standing. The absence of such an interest may mean
the person does not have standing to challenge a search, but it should also
mean the person has no authority to consent to a search. If passengers
cannot argue that a search of the car was unconstitutional, they should not
be able to consent to a search of the car. Hence, if consent is valid with a
reasonable belief that the consenter has an interest in the space, that person
should also have standing to contest the associated search.97
One may argue that the distinction is unimportant because the Rakas
Court implicitly left open the possibility that passengers can assert
standing if they owned the items seized.98 However, this argument fails for
two reasons. First, evidence that does not belong to the passenger can still
be admitted against the passenger. Second, and more importantly, this

96. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188–89 (1990).
97. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 163 (White, J., dissenting) (“If a nonowner may consent to a
search . . . then that same nonowner must have a protected privacy interest. The scope of the
authority sufficient to grant a valid consent can hardly be broader than the contours of protected
privacy.”); Christopher Slobogin, Having It Both Ways: Proof That the U.S. Supreme Court Is
“Unfairly” Prosecution-Oriented, 48 FLA. L. REV. 743, 746–47 (1996).
98. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 132 n.1, 142 n.11, 148. Furthermore, this conflicts with the longheld understanding that the Fourth Amendment protects privacy, not property. After all, even a
person with no possessions is still entitled to expect privacy in certain circumstances. Id. at 164
n.14 (White, J., dissenting).
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reading of Rakas is inconsistent with the Court’s other cases.99 In Rawlings
v. Kentucky, decided two years after Rakas, the Court expressly held that
mere ownership of an item was insufficient to establish a reasonable
expectation of privacy.100 Thus, passengers cannot rely on ownership of
items placed in a car to acquire standing to challenge their seizure.
Hence, the distinction between the rule for passenger standing to
challenge searches and the rule for passenger standing to challenge
seizures is not founded on logic or constitutionally significant differences.
The holding of Brendlin and the holding of Rakas, while they both may be
internally consistent and adequately supported on their own, cannot be
reconciled with each other because the differences in outcome do not turn
on differences in expectations of privacy. A recommendation to remedy
this problem will be explored in Part VI. Before that, however, it is
necessary to examine the root of this problem; namely, the Court’s
apparent inability to accurately determine reasonableness in the search and
seizure context.
V. THE COURT ’S (IN )ABILITY TO DETERMINE REASONABLENESS
IN SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
To determine whether a person has a “reasonable” expectation of
privacy, the Court must take into account all the facts and circumstances
and determine what a “reasonable” person would expect in that
situation.101 This inquiry also encompasses a judgment about society, in
that the Court must determine whether this expectation of privacy is one
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.102 However,
commentators have criticized the Court’s judgment in this area, arguing
that the Court’s rationales have been flawed and inconsistent.103 This Part

99. See Slobogin, supra note 36, at 414–15.
100. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105–06 (1980).
101. See id.
102. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (noting that the definition of the
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy must be made with reference “to understandings that
are recognized and permitted by society”).
103. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757,
759 (1994) (“Fourth Amendment case law is a sinking ocean liner—rudderless and badly off
course . . . .”); Clark D. Cunningham, A Linguistic Analysis of the Meanings of “Search” in the
Fourth Amendment: A Search for Common Sense, 73 IOWA L. REV. 541, 572–73 (1988)
(questioning the Court’s sincerity in its reasonableness holdings); Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood
Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 723, 745 (1992)
(questioning several of the Court’s reasonableness holdings); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts
About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 825 (1994) (“There can be no doubt that the
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is riddled with inconsistencies . . . .”); Rachel
A. Van Cleave, Note, Michigan v. Chesternut and Investigative Pursuits: Is There No End to the
War Between the Constitution and Common Sense?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 203, 219 (1988) (questioning
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examines several of those decisions.
A. Determinations of Reasonableness in Searches
In Smith v. Maryland,104 police installed a device called a pen register,
which records the numbers dialed on a suspect’s phone.105 The device was
located at the phone company, not at the suspect’s home.106 The Court held
that this installation did not constitute a search, because there was no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers dialed from one’s
home.107 Although the decision in this case was not particularly
controversial, the Court’s reasoning is troublesome. Its chief reason was
that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily turned over to a third party—because in doing so, the person
has assumed the risk that the third party will disclose the information.108
The Court also relied on this notion when it held that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the garbage that one puts at the curb,109 and, in
an even further perversion of the assumption of the risk doctrine, the Court
has held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records
because a reasonable person voluntarily yields financial information to a
bank knowing that the bank may disclose the information to the
government.110
Justice Marshall’s dissent in Smith illustrates its serious logical flaw:
Even if an individual knows that a phone company uses pen registers for

the Court’s sincerity in its reasonableness holding). But see Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism,
and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 205 (1993) (arguing that the
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is theoretically consistent).
104. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
105. Id. at 737.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 742.
108. Id. at 743–44; see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1976), superseded
by statute, Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641; Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335–36 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971);
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 437–39
(1963) (all holding that divulging information to a third party defeats any legitimate expectation
of privacy).
109. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988). For a critique of Greenwood and
similar cases, see Hope Lynne Karp, Casenote, Trash: A Matter of Privacy?, 20 PACE L. REV. 541,
562–63 (2000).
110. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. Indeed, if it is not reasonable to expect privacy in a bank, where
one knows that the bank will take steps to safeguard information, it is difficult to imagine a place
where one can expect his or her information to be kept private. Justice Stewart, dissenting in Smith,
took issue with the majority’s holding, pointing out that it was at odds with the Court’s landmark
decision in Katz v. United States. Smith, 442 U.S. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting). After all, it was
Katz that held that information gleaned from a public telephone was protected by the Fourth
Amendment. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
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internal monitoring, it certainly does not follow that the individual expects
this information to be made available to the public or the government.111
It is not reasonable to say that, when people divulge information to a
necessary third party like a phone company or a bank, they should expect
that the government or the public at large will see the information. The
Court’s “assumption of the risk” rationale falls apart because people are
required to divulge information to phone companies, banks, and garbage
collectors to carry out their everyday lives. No one voluntarily assumes
these risks because there is no other choice.112 Moreover, especially with
regard to the case involving garbage,113 just because a person knows that
a third party may view certain information does not make the assumption
that a third party will view the information reasonable. On the contrary, a
reasonable person expects the events to unfold like they do virtually every
time garbage is left at the curb: the garbage will be taken to a processing
site and its contents will not be viewed. The rare instances in which third
parties do gain access to such information do not change this expectation.
People should not be charged with taking into account every remote
possibility when calculating whether they will have privacy.
The Court continued to demonstrate a disconnect with reality with its
decision in California v. Ciraolo.114 In Ciraolo, police wanted to view the
inside of the respondent’s backyard, but could not do so because the
respondent had erected a six-foot outer fence and a ten-foot inner fence
that completely enclosed the yard.115 The police secured a private plane
and flew over the respondent’s house at an altitude of 1,000 feet to view
the inside of the backyard.116 In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the
respondent’s expectation of privacy was not reasonable because the
backyard was observable from public airspace and without any physical
intrusion.117 Incredibly, the Court noted that “[a]ny member of the public
flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that
these officers observed.”118 Even if this suggestion were true, it strains
credulity to say there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a fenced-in
backyard because someone could see it by flying overhead.119

111. Smith, 442 U.S. at 748–49 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
112. See id. at 749–50.
113. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 35.
114. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
115. Id. at 209.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 213–14.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 223–24 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Travelers on [planes] . . . normally obtain at most
a fleeting, anonymous, and nondiscriminating glimpse of the landscape and buildings over which
they pass. The risk that a passenger on such a plane might observe private activities, and might
connect those activities with particular people, is simply too trivial to protect against.” (internal
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For automobile searches, as in Rakas v. Illinois,120 the Court also
reached results difficult to justify. According to the Court, it is
unreasonable for a passenger to expect privacy in a car, but it is reasonable
for a driver to expect it.121 The basis for this holding is puzzling. It makes
little sense to say that a driver has a more reasonable expectation of
privacy just because the driver is operating the car. If both the driver and
the passenger leave important documents in a car while it is parked in a
public place, there is little chance of another person viewing them. The
same reasoning applies to the traffic stop situation. What if, right before
they are pulled over, the passenger and driver switch places? Does the
former driver’s previously reasonable expectation of privacy suddenly
become unreasonable? A person’s position in the car does not change an
expectation of privacy, and to hold otherwise is “contrary . . . to the
everyday expectations of privacy that we all share.”122
Further, by holding that passengers must have some interest in the
particular items seized or spaces searched before they have standing, the
Rakas Court essentially said that passengers have no legitimate
expectation of privacy in cars unless they carry personal belongings with
them or somehow “assert” an interest in some particular space in the car.123
And according to the Court, even placing items into a locked glove
compartment is insufficient to assert such an interest. Yet again, the Court
misses the mark: Any passenger reasonably expects a certain level of
privacy in a car whether or not they take anything with them. Indeed,
“[e]ven a person living in a barren room without possessions is entitled to
expect that the police will not intrude without cause.”124
Not only has the Court employed a dubious reasonableness inquiry, but
it has done so inconsistently. For instance, in Bond v. United States, the
Court held that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a softsided piece of luggage on a bus traveling long distances.125 In Bond,
Border Patrol agents boarded a bus and randomly felt the outside of the

citation omitted)). In a similar case, the Court has also held that aerial surveillance from a
helicopter hovering at 400 feet did not constitute a search for similar reasons. Florida v. Riley, 488
U.S. 445, 450–51 (1989).
120. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
121. Id. at 148.
122. Id. at 167 (White, J., dissenting).
123. Furthermore, it seems unfair to put a defendant in the “criminally tendentious position”
of choosing between on the one hand admitting ownership of contraband to win a suppression
motion (but being convicted of possession), and on the other hand refusing to admit ownership and
losing the suppression motion. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 262 (1960), overruled by
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). For a similar critique, see LAFAVE, supra note 13,
§ 11.3(e), at 194.
124. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 164 n.14 (White, J., dissenting).
125. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000).
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luggage that was placed on the overhead rack.126 The Court held that this
physical manipulation was a search because a reasonable person would
expect privacy in the contents of luggage, as it is not expected that “other
passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an
exploratory manner.”127 This reasonable holding cannot be reconciled with
the Court’s previous decisions on the reasonableness of privacy
expectations. Indeed, if it is reasonable to expect that a soft-sided bag, in
the course of public transportation, will not be felt in an exploratory
manner, why is it not reasonable to expect that someone will not fly a
plane 1,000 feet over your house and look into your backyard?128 It is
much more likely that a member of the traveling public will squeeze a
soft-sided bag on a bus than observe the contents of a backyard from
navigable airspace. Thus, although in many instances the Court has held
that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in areas where most
people clearly would expect privacy, in other instances the Court has held
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in areas where few people
would expect any.
B. Determinations of Reasonableness in Seizures
The Court’s analysis of reasonableness in seizures has also been
questionable. For example, in Florida v. Bostick, two armed officers
boarded a bus at a temporary stopping point.129 They approached the
respondent, stood over him, blocked the aisle so that he could not leave,
and began to interrogate him.130 They asked him for his ticket and
identification, and then asked for consent to search his luggage.131
Although the Court concluded that a reasonable person in that situation
would have felt completely free to refuse to answer the officers’ questions
and terminate the encounter with the police,132 it is difficult to imagine
how that could be true.133 As the dissent points out, if the respondent

126. Id. at 335–36.
127. Id. at 338–39.
128. See David G. Savage, Hands-Off Policy: Just Because Police Can See a Bag Doesn’t
Mean They Can Touch It, 86 A.B.A. J., June 2000, at 36, 36 (calling the holding in Bond surprising);
Stacy E. Roberts, Note, Bond and Beyond: A Shift in the Understanding of What Constitutes a
Fourth Amendment Search, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 457, 469–70 (2002) (noting that Bond was
inconsistent with previous precedent); cf. Andrew P. Heck, Note, The Wheels on the Bus Go ‘Round
and ‘Round: Addressing the Need to Provide Greater Latitude to Law Enforcement Officers in the
Public Transportation Setting, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 169, 170 (1999) (calling for more flexibility for
law enforcement officers in conducting searches in public transportation settings).
129. 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991).
130. Id. at 431–32.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 435.
133. See id. at 444–45 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“I agree that the appropriate question is
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wanted to exercise his right to terminate the encounter, he had only two
options.134 He could have “remained seated while obstinately refusing to
respond to the officers’ questioning,” or he “could have tried to escape the
officers’ presence by leaving the bus altogether.”135 Faced with these
possibilities, is it truly reasonable to think he had a choice? The answer is
clearly no. The police’s show of authority in this case, given the
circumstances, was surely enough to cause a reasonable person to believe
that he could not terminate the encounter with the police.
Another similar case is United States v. Drayton, in which officers
approached Drayton on a bus and asked for consent to search him.136
Following Bostick, the Court held that, given all the circumstances, a
reasonable person in that situation would have felt free to decline the
officers’ requests and terminate the encounter with the police, and thus the
police conduct did not amount to a seizure.137 The Court partially relied on
the fact that, because a bus contains “many fellow passengers . . . to
witness officers’ conduct, a reasonable person may feel even more secure
in his or her decision not to cooperate with police on a bus than in other
circumstances.”138
Justice Souter, writing for the dissent, noted that there was an “air of
unreality” surrounding the Court’s explanation for its decision.139 In
reality, the police made a show of force that would convey to any
reasonable person that police efforts were not to be ignored without
consequences. The questioning in cramped quarters, in view of a busload
of passengers anxious to be on their way, actually increased the coercive
atmosphere rather than decreased it, as the Court suggested. Thus, no
reasonable passenger “would have believed that he stood to lose nothing
if he refused to cooperate with the police, or that he had any free choice to
ignore the police altogether,” and therefore the police’s conduct should
have amounted to a seizure.140
whether a passenger who is approached during such a sweep ‘would feel free to decline the officers'
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.’ What I cannot understand is how the majority can
possibly suggest an affirmative answer to this question.”).
134. Id. at 447–48.
135. Id.
136. 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
137. Id. at 200.
138. Id. at 204.
139. Id. at 208 (Souter, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 212. Other cases demonstrate a similar disconnect in the Court’s reasonableness
analysis. See, e.g., Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988) (holding no seizure where
police cruiser followed suspect on foot); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547–48 (1980)
(holding no seizure where federal agents approached suspect in an airport, identified themselves,
asked to see her identification and plane ticket, asked her several questions, asked her to accompany
them to an office for further questioning, and then asked to search her bag). Professor LaFave has
argued that the Court probably does not really believe that a person feels free to leave when
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C. How Do We Measure ‘Reasonableness’?
Legal scholars and social scientists have conducted studies to
determine just what expectations of privacy society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. The Court’s determination of reasonableness is
implicitly based on the view of the average citizen, or at least in some way
should be an accurate reflection of what the American public thinks.141
However, the results of one study suggest that the Court’s decisions on
reasonableness do not reflect societal understandings.142 For example,
individuals surveyed believed that being approached by officers on a
bus—the situation in Bostick—was sufficiently more intrusive than the
Bostick Court indicated.143 Similarly, where United States v. Miller held
that one is not justified to expect privacy in the information disclosed to
a bank, surveyed individuals viewed a scenario involving government
inspection of bank records as particularly intrusive.144 These
inconsistencies demonstrate the manipulability of the concept of privacy.
Indeed, although privacy advocates hailed the Court’s decision in Katz to
abandon reliance on property law concepts and instead to focus more on
privacy as a major step in protecting citizens from government intrusion,145
recent commentators, distraught at the Court’s inconsistent interpretation
of privacy, have called for a move away from privacy as the definition of
a Fourth Amendment search.146
confronted by a uniformed police officer, but that its holdings to the contrary are justified on policy
grounds. See Wayne R. LaFave, Pinguitudinous Police, Pachydermatous Prey: Whence Fourth
Amendment "Seizures”?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 729, 741 (1991).
141. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (noting that the definition of the
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy must be made with reference “to understandings that
are recognized and permitted by society”).
142. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and
Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 732 (1993) (“Although tentative, the results strongly
suggest that some of the Court's decisions regarding the threshold of the Fourth Amendment . . . do
not reflect societal understandings. Indeed, some of the Court’s conclusions in this regard may be
well off the mark.”).
143. Id. at 742.
144. Id. at 740.
145. See Christopher Slobogin, The Liberal Assault on the Fourth Amendment, 4 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 603, 605 (2007).
146. See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, A Liberal House Divided: How the Warren Court Dismantled
the Fourth Amendment, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 33, 58 (2005) (arguing for a return to property law
concepts); Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the
Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1328–30 (1990) (discussing the Supreme Court’s mistaken
emphasis on privacy interests); Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call For
Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053, 1054 (1998) (arguing
that the Fourth Amendment analysis should be based on a balance between the need to search or
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In sum, the Court’s analysis is problematic because its determinations
of a reasonable person’s expectations are out of touch with reality. While
ostensibly basing its decisions on common societal understandings, the
Court continues to render holdings that do not reflect society’s
expectations.
VI. A RECOMMENDATION
With its decision in Brendlin, the Court created an inconsistency that
needs to be resolved. Practically, passenger standing to challenge police
misconduct can vary widely based on the slightest difference in
circumstances. Theoretically, there is no constitutionally significant
difference in a passenger’s invasion of privacy between lawful and
unlawful traffic stops. However, the reason for the inconsistency is not the
standing doctrine itself; the reason is the misapplication of the standing
doctrine.
The correct path would be granting passengers standing to challenge
searches of automobiles. Doing so would not require a shift in the
applicable law; the test would still only allow those “searched” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment to have standing to challenge the
constitutionality of that search. The change would involve a different
application of the law—a change in the objective factual determination of
what is “reasonable.” The Court must recognize a passenger’s reasonable
expectation of privacy in a car, and even more so in closed compartments
such as the glove compartment or inside the center console. Justice White,
writing for the majority in Delaware v. Prouse, effectively illustrates the
point:
Undoubtedly, many find a greater sense of security and
privacy in traveling in an automobile than they do in exposing
themselves by pedestrian or other modes of travel. Were the
individual subject to unfettered governmental intrusion every
time he entered an automobile, the security guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment would be seriously circumscribed. As
Terry v. Ohio recognized, people are not shorn of all Fourth
Amendment protection when they step from their homes onto
the public sidewalks. Nor are they shorn of those interests
when they step from the sidewalks into their automobiles.147
seize against the invasion which the search or seizure entails); William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem
and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1020 (1995) (arguing that the Fourth
Amendment analysis should be based on coercion); Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman” ’s Fourth
Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751,
1777 (1994) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment analysis should be based on trust between the
government and its citizens).
147. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662–63 (1979).
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This change will harmonize the passenger standing doctrine as it
applies to searches and seizures, and will eliminate the unnecessary
distinction between the two. Furthermore, it will serve to effectively deter
police misconduct. Even though the Brendlin Court concluded that its
decision would deter police misconduct, the current status of the passenger
standing for searches doctrine does not significantly deter unjustified
police action. That is, Brendlin provides sufficient deterrence from making
unjustified traffic stops in the hopes of discovering contraband, because
police know that any evidence obtained after the unlawful stop will be
inadmissible against both the driver and the passenger. However, no such
incentive for restraint exists for automobile searches, because following
a lawful traffic stop, police can conduct unlawful searches of cars,
knowing that any evidence obtained will be inadmissible against the
driver, but fully admissible against the passenger. The police’s
far-reaching authority during traffic stops compounds this problem. For
instance, police may make pretextual traffic stops when their true intent is
to investigate other crimes,148 and they may stop drivers for any minor
traffic violation, even if no reasonable officer would make such a stop.149
They may also arrest the driver for a minor traffic violation, even if that
violation carries no penalty of jail time.150
Abuse of the standing doctrine has already been seen in other contexts.
In United States v. Payner, the IRS affirmatively counseled its agents to
allow criminal and unconstitutional searches and seizures of evidence in
the custody of third parties and then to invoke the standing doctrine to get
the evidence admitted against the party who was the target of the
investigation.151 Despite the district court’s and court of appeals’ refusal
to condone such outrageous and illegal government behavior, the Supreme
Court held that, pursuant to the standing doctrine, the evidence was
admissible against the target because the target’s Fourth Amendment
rights had not been violated.152 Therefore, to provide effective deterrence
against unlawful searches of automobiles, evidence obtained by an
unlawful search must be made inadmissible against both the driver and the
passenger by giving the passenger standing to challenge the
constitutionality of these searches. This solution best promotes the policies
and purpose behind the Fourth Amendment.

148. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996) (“We flatly dismissed the idea that an
ulterior motive might serve to strip the agents of their legal justification.”). For a discussion of
Whren’s implications, see Kenneth Gavsie, Making the Best of “Whren”: The Problems with
Pretextual Traffic Stops and the Need for Restraint, 50 FLA. L. REV. 385, 387–88 (1998).
149. Whren, 517 U.S. at 818.
150. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001).
151. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 729–30 (1980).
152. Id. at 730–31.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Passengers should not shed their constitutional rights when they accept
a ride in another’s car. The limitation on passenger standing to challenge
searches of cars began on shaky constitutional ground. Since Brendlin in
2007, the search limitation is now completely inconsistent with the
allowance of passenger standing to challenge seizures. The line between
standing to challenge seizures and standing to challenge searches rests on
a distinction without a constitutional difference. The solution is to bring
the Court’s reasonableness jurisprudence in line with widely shared social
expectations and declare that passengers have reasonable expectations of
privacy in the cars in which they ride.
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